A Bipartisan Savior? The Coming of the Iraq Study Group's Report

The American citizenry’s frustration over the ongoing war in Iraq was easily perceivable before the midterm elections, but the “thumpin” communicated that message in terms that registered with politicians: legislative power. Post-election, politicians from both sides of the aisle have eagerly pointed to the Iraq Study Group’s upcoming report as evidence that they too recognize the urgent need to adopt a new course of action. The mainstream media has helped fan the anticipation by largely accepting as fact the notion that the group’s recommendations will inject new life into the Bush administration’s flailing policies. Meanwhile, the administration and congress’s regard for the group (also known as the Baker-Hamilton Commission) as a foreign policy savior is only enhanced by their opting to forgo action in the weeks leading up to its release.

A few dissenting voices, notably Michael Kinsley and Harvard lecturer Juliette N. Kayyem, have questioned these grand expectations and unbridled anticipation. Noting that commissions are generally charged with addressing long-term issues such as Social Security reform, Kinsley writes, “The chance that this group of aging white men, plus Vernon Jordan and Sandra Day O'Connor, will come up with something original is not enormous. It's a nutty, and not very attractive, idea to turn an urgent issue of war and peace over to a commission.” Agreeing that expectations far exceed the group's ability to deliver a fresh approach, Kayyem argues that “what we are waiting for is not a new idea, but the political cover to make some sort of change of course.”

It is true that bipartisan committees are often the vehicle through which difficult but necessary reforms can gain political traction. Shielded from the electorate, the efficacy of such groups lies in their ability to impart big-name credibility on pre-existing policy alternatives rather than to devise revolutionary approaches. Thus, while Michael Kinsley’s contention that the Iraq Study Group will not introduce fresh ideas may be valid, historical precedent implies it need not do so in order to make known alternatives tenable.

Rather than evaluating the degree to which the growing anticipation in unwarranted, we might instead question the chances that the group's recommendations will be implemented. Looking at another high-profile bipartisan committee, the 9/11 Commission, in comparison helps shed light on the bureaucratic hurdles that the Iraq Study Group may encounter. The 9/11 report represented an exhaustive investigation into the problems inherent in U.S. intelligence agencies and recommended a series of sweeping reforms to rectify them. It was applauded by the administration and congressional leaders of all political stripes, who competed to one-up each other through grandiose pledges of support for swift implementation.

Two details deserve further attention: first, the commission’s findings were largely regarded as an authoritative articulation of well-known problems rather than truly novel concepts; and second, over two years after the release of the 9/11 Commission report, minimal progress has been made on issues ranging from border security to emergency preparedness and foreign policy initiatives. In short, many of the ideas put forth by this highly regarded commission have yet to become actionable through legislative implementation.

Looking at the fate of the 9/11 recommendations makes it clear that the debate over whether or not the Iraq Study Group's findings represent a truly fresh approach is slightly misplaced. Bipartisan commissions do not necessarily need to present entirely novel ideas to be effective, and if historical precedent is any indication, the Iraq Study Group will present a sober policy analysis that calls on the U.S. to adopt pre-circulated policy alternatives. It is neither a foreign policy savior nor a frivolous waste, and it will hopefully provide the political cover for officials to do what they know they should be doing. The real debate should be raging over how a fractured and notoriously inefficient government will translate the group's recommendations into actionable policies.