Hayat al-Flooz

As a wee-one in the Heartland, writing was my pleasure, solace and therapy all in one. As I settle into unsettled living in New York City, it is due time to reconnect with my old friend. Enjoy the attempted intellectual musings and personal reflections; comment with reckless abandon. Welcome to the life of Flooz.

Thursday, December 07, 2006

an afternoon treat

Leading up to the James Baker/Lee Hamilton–led Iraq Study Group’s Wednesday briefing with President Bush, the media was abuzz speculating about both the contents of the report and how the administration might react. On the former, articles suggesting that the commission would recommend engaging in talks with Syria and Iran (Financial Times), re-prioritizing negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians (Time), and reassigning troops to a training role in advance of their withdrawal (Time,Wall Street Journal,New York Times) turned out to be accurate.

Baker did mention that a temporary increase in troop levels may be necessary, echoing the growing chorus—led by Senator John McCain and George Will—that is calling for more troops on the ground. The Wall Street Journal reported on December 4 that senior military officials inside the Pentagon, particularly a small study group reporting to General Peter Pace, will be pushing for increased troop levels in a final attempt to stabilize Iraq.

The president spent the weeks leading up to the report’s release sending mixed messages and ultimately distancing himself from certain recommendations. National Security Advisor Steven Hadley said on Meet the Press that the president plans “significant changes” to his strategy in Iraq that he will implement after hearing recommendations from both the Iraq Study Group and General Pace. Additionally, political analysts have pointed to Bush’s selection of Robert Gates to replace Defense Secretary Rumsfeld as evidence that the “realists” have again found favor among Republicans. However, Hadley also made clear that “the way forward” (which is the subtitle of the report) would not include a withdrawal of troops “regardless of what was happening on the ground,” directly contradicting the Iraq Study Group’s anticipated recommendation to link troop withdrawal to security (or lack there of).

President Bush offered his first official comments on the bipartisan commission during a press conference with Prime Minister al-Maliki, saying, “there’s a lot of speculation that these reports in Washington mean there’s going to be some kind of graceful exit out of Iraq. We’re going to stay in Iraq to get the job done, so long as the government wants us there.” Senior administration officials have been hinting that the president’s plan includes an eventual troop withdrawal, but firmly rejects any ultimatums or hard timelines. Wednesday, the president said he would take the Iraq Study Group’s finding “very seriously” and act on them “in a timely fashion,” but refused to specifically align himself with its recommendations.

So what “major adjustments” in the Iraq strategy will President Bush put forward? The debate mostly has functioned along a single axis: troop levels, a central point addressed by the Baker/Hamilton commission and General Pace’s working group. This narrow debate largely ignores the fact that, as Anthony Cordesman of Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) succinctly put it, “adding more boots on the ground is pointless” without “the right brains above them.” Reaching out to other players in the region would constitute the type of strategic overhaul that is needed, but the president has constrained his options by asserting repeatedly that negotiating with “rogue states” such as Iran and Syria is out of the question.

After his Wednesday briefing, he predictably extended a gracious thank you to James Baker and Lee Hamilton for leading the bipartisan group and promised to consider their recommendations. Yet, he is ultimately left with few options, none of which are particularly compelling or novel. Having preemptively rejected the Iraq Study Group’s central recommendations of troop withdrawal and renewed diplomacy, it will require a presidential about face to adopt its advice. Meanwhile, the war’s shrinking popularity among Americans renders increasing troop levels unviable. Even Republicans will shy away from escalation as they set their eyes upon regaining power in 2008. In short, Bush’s “way forward” probably won’t look very new.

As Time magazine’s cover story points out, Bush has been known to abruptly change courses—albeit months or years after he should have—and an old, trusted friend like Gates might be able right the ship. However, in this instance, the “Decider” does not have the luxury of time. As escalating sectarian violence bleeds into civil war, it may not matter if he makes the right choice after years of making the wrong ones. Meanwhile, members of the media, who have given the Bush administration and Congress some political breathing room in anticipation of the report, should demand prompt answers to the hardest question: What now, Mr. President?

Monday, December 04, 2006

A Bipartisan Savior? The Coming of the Iraq Study Group's Report

The American citizenry’s frustration over the ongoing war in Iraq was easily perceivable before the midterm elections, but the “thumpin” communicated that message in terms that registered with politicians: legislative power. Post-election, politicians from both sides of the aisle have eagerly pointed to the Iraq Study Group’s upcoming report as evidence that they too recognize the urgent need to adopt a new course of action. The mainstream media has helped fan the anticipation by largely accepting as fact the notion that the group’s recommendations will inject new life into the Bush administration’s flailing policies. Meanwhile, the administration and congress’s regard for the group (also known as the Baker-Hamilton Commission) as a foreign policy savior is only enhanced by their opting to forgo action in the weeks leading up to its release.

A few dissenting voices, notably Michael Kinsley and Harvard lecturer Juliette N. Kayyem, have questioned these grand expectations and unbridled anticipation. Noting that commissions are generally charged with addressing long-term issues such as Social Security reform, Kinsley writes, “The chance that this group of aging white men, plus Vernon Jordan and Sandra Day O'Connor, will come up with something original is not enormous. It's a nutty, and not very attractive, idea to turn an urgent issue of war and peace over to a commission.” Agreeing that expectations far exceed the group's ability to deliver a fresh approach, Kayyem argues that “what we are waiting for is not a new idea, but the political cover to make some sort of change of course.”

It is true that bipartisan committees are often the vehicle through which difficult but necessary reforms can gain political traction. Shielded from the electorate, the efficacy of such groups lies in their ability to impart big-name credibility on pre-existing policy alternatives rather than to devise revolutionary approaches. Thus, while Michael Kinsley’s contention that the Iraq Study Group will not introduce fresh ideas may be valid, historical precedent implies it need not do so in order to make known alternatives tenable.

Rather than evaluating the degree to which the growing anticipation in unwarranted, we might instead question the chances that the group's recommendations will be implemented. Looking at another high-profile bipartisan committee, the 9/11 Commission, in comparison helps shed light on the bureaucratic hurdles that the Iraq Study Group may encounter. The 9/11 report represented an exhaustive investigation into the problems inherent in U.S. intelligence agencies and recommended a series of sweeping reforms to rectify them. It was applauded by the administration and congressional leaders of all political stripes, who competed to one-up each other through grandiose pledges of support for swift implementation.

Two details deserve further attention: first, the commission’s findings were largely regarded as an authoritative articulation of well-known problems rather than truly novel concepts; and second, over two years after the release of the 9/11 Commission report, minimal progress has been made on issues ranging from border security to emergency preparedness and foreign policy initiatives. In short, many of the ideas put forth by this highly regarded commission have yet to become actionable through legislative implementation.

Looking at the fate of the 9/11 recommendations makes it clear that the debate over whether or not the Iraq Study Group's findings represent a truly fresh approach is slightly misplaced. Bipartisan commissions do not necessarily need to present entirely novel ideas to be effective, and if historical precedent is any indication, the Iraq Study Group will present a sober policy analysis that calls on the U.S. to adopt pre-circulated policy alternatives. It is neither a foreign policy savior nor a frivolous waste, and it will hopefully provide the political cover for officials to do what they know they should be doing. The real debate should be raging over how a fractured and notoriously inefficient government will translate the group's recommendations into actionable policies.